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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the discovery of DNA and its potential uses in the field of forensics, 
countries across the world have been trying to find ways to use DNA testing 
to their advantage.  Often, this leads to unique and challenging legal 
questions.  In the United States, arrestee DNA legislation has proven to be a 
controversial issue with just over half of U.S. states enacting laws for the 
purpose of creating and maintaining DNA databases, and half the states 
remaining without such laws.1  Meanwhile, the federal government also 
collects arrestee DNA in certain cases.2  In many states this type of 
legislation has been challenged as unconstitutional, despite advocates of such 
data collection consistently lobbying for it across the nation.3  These 
challenges have resulted in split decisions amongst state and federal courts 
across the United States.4  
Signaling the importance of the matter, the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided Maryland v. King, in which Maryland’s arrestee DNA 
legislation was challenged as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 270 
NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 18, 19 (2012).  
 2 DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006). 
 3 See Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 19.  
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
collection of DNA from arrestees is constitutional, because arrestees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy); United States v. Fricosu, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(finding that arrestee DNA sample obtained upon probable cause for commission of a federal 
felony is constitutional); United States v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45333 (W.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 14, 2011) (finding that “the government’s interest in accurate and rapid identifications 
outweighs [the defendant’s] privacy interest in the collection and analysis of a DNA sample”); 
Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Haskell v. Harris, 
669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a motion to enjoin enforcement of California’s 
arrestee DNA statute, noting that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in establishing a 
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation); United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009) (upholding the constitutionality of DNA sample collection from those arrested 
upon a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause for the commission of a felony); 
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012) (taking DNA upon arrest involves two distinct 
intrusions on a juvenile’s privacy); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Reptr. 3d 753 (2011), transferred 
with direction to vacate, 302 P.3d 1051 (2013) (holding the California DNA Act, in requiring 
felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample without independent suspicion, warrant, or grand 
jury determination of probable cause, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); In re Welfare 
of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the Minnesota DNA arrestee 
statute constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 
S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007) (collecting DNA from someone arrested for a violent felony does not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation). 
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guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.5  Petitioner Alonzo 
King challenged his conviction for rape, claiming that it was based on an 
unlawful search and seizure, as his DNA profile had been collected upon his 
arrest for a separate, unrelated crime.6  In the majority opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, the Court held that the collection of a DNA sample upon arrest for 
a serious offense was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.7  
Still, the Court’s opinion may be read quite broadly and does not answer 
all of the questions about DNA collection legislation in the United States.  
The debate forming around the collection and retention of DNA in the 
United States may be illuminated by the actions of other countries that have 
implemented similar laws.  Many legislators attempt to strike a balance 
between citizens’ rights to privacy and the legitimate state interests that are 
served by arrestee DNA sampling and retention as they make a foray into 
this area of forensic science.  By taking note of what other countries have 
already tried and what other courts have already deemed acceptable or 
unacceptable, the United States could avoid some of the potential downfalls 
of DNA sampling and retention. 
The first country to implement a DNA databank system was the United 
Kingdom, followed swiftly by other European nations and the United States.8  
The U.K. began collecting and maintaining DNA profiles in their National 
DNA Database (NDNAD) in 1995.9  This database was, until very recently, 
the largest DNA database in the world, with roughly 5.5 million unique 
profiles collected as of March 1, 2012.10  Proportionally, it is still the largest 
database in the world and, numerically, is second only to the United States’ 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which has over 6 million profiles 
                                                                                                                   
 5 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 6 Id. at 1965. 
 7 Id. at 1980.  This case will likely have a lasting effect for decades to come and invites 
exploration of many Fourth Amendment issues, but the focus of this Note is on DNA 
collection and retention.  It is for another day to explore the implications it will have on U.S. 
privacy law and criminal procedure. 
 8 Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We’re British: Investigating Crime with 
DNA in the U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 492 (2008); 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL GLOBAL DNA SURVEY 2008 
KEY FACTS (indicating that as of 2008, forty-two member-states employed a DNA database). 
 9 Carling, supra note 8. 
 10 Karen J. Maschke, DNA and Law Enforcement, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO 
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, 
AND CAMPAIGNS 45–50 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).  
160 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:157 
 
 
collected.11  Proponents of the widespread sampling of arrestee DNA profiles 
and databases often point to the U.K. as the leading example of how to best 
implement such systems and how advantageous they can be in aiding 
criminal investigations and preventing crime.12  
There have been several studies performed in the United States 
documenting the purportedly advantageous uses of arrestee DNA 
databases.13  One such study indicated that requiring the collection of DNA 
profiles upon felony arrest rather than felony conviction could have 
prevented sixty violent crimes, including fifty-three murders and rapes.14  
The study stressed that the eight convicted persons studied had twenty-one 
prior felony arrests between them, only seven of which were for violent 
crimes.15  A similar Maryland study suggests obtaining DNA samples upon 
arrest of three individuals charged with a burglary, a sex offense, or a violent 
crime could have prevented twenty other crimes.16  One can infer from these 
studies that in order for arrestee DNA sampling to best serve the public 
interest, sampling should not be limited to samples taken upon arrest for 
violent crimes, but should be extended to all felonies, as violent crimes are 
often committed by people who have previously been arrested for non-
violent felonies.  Undoubtedly, the collection, retention, and comparison of 
                                                                                                                   
 11 National DNA Database Statistics, https://www.gov/uk/government/publications/nation 
al-dna-database-statistics (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).  As a point of clarity, the NDNAD 
actually contains roughly 5.6 million DNA profiles, but that number also includes 
approximately 1 million “duplicate” profiles from the same people, for various reasons, so the 
number of unique profiles in the system is approximately 4.8 million. 
 12 Jay Siegel & Susan D. Narveson, Why Arrestee DNA Legislation Can Save Indiana 
Taxpayers Over $60 Million per Year, 6–7 (Jan. 2009), available at http://dnasaves.org/files/ 
IN_DNA_Cost_Savings_Study.pdf. 
 13 See CITY OF CHICAGO, REQUIRING DNA FOR FELONY ARRESTS CAN SOLVE AND PREVENT 
VIOLENT CRIMES.  WAITING FOR CONVICTION CAN COST LIVES (2005), available at http://www. 
dnasaves.org/files/ChicagoPreventableCrimes.pdf [hereinafter CHICAGO STUDIES]; MARYLAND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SYS., BALTIMORE CTY. POLICE DEP’T & MARYLAND STATE POLICE, 
REQUIRING DNA FOR QUALIFYING ARRESTS IN THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION CAN SOLVE AND 
PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMES (2008), available at http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arr 
estee_Database/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf [hereinafter MARYLAND STUDY]; WASHINGTON 
STATE PREVENTABLE CRIME STUDY (2008), available at http://www.dnasaves.org/files/WASH 
INGTON_STATE_PREVENTABLE_CRIME.pdf; DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
REQUIRING DNA FOR FELONY ARRESTS CAN SOLVE AND PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMES (2009), 
available at http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Denver's%20Preventable%20Crimes 
%20Study.pdf. 
 14 See CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 13. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See MARYLAND STUDY, supra note 13. 
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arrestee DNA samples would provide a significant advantage in criminal 
investigations and potentially in preventing crime.  
While widespread DNA sampling can serve as an important tool in 
fighting crime, it can also create tension with human rights concerns.  In late 
2008, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) declared the U.K.’s 
widespread collection and indefinite retention of arrestee DNA samples to be 
a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.17  Even prior to 
this holding, many human rights activists and commentators had expressed 
concern about the potential violations of privacy that were occurring in the 
U.K.18  Additionally, there were concerns that the U.K. databases were being 
used to perpetuate racial discrimination.  Further, commentators noted the 
databases’ potential for future misuse, including accessing the stored 
information for purposes other than criminal investigations.19  Finally, 
statistics showed that the DNA profiles of many people who had either been 
acquitted or never been charged in the first place remained in the databanks, 
with authorities refusing to delete them.  All of these concerns were brought 
to light in the ECtHR’s 2008 ruling. 
The purpose of this Note is to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
developments in U.K. law in the field of forensic DNA databasing in light of 
the United States’ recent foray into this area.  As such, this Note will 
examine the debate that surrounded the drafting and implementation of the 
U.K.’s various statutes that allow for such widespread sampling and 
retention of DNA profiles.  Part II will focus on the particular statutes and 
amendments that expanded DNA profile collection in the U.K.  Specifically, 
U.K. legislators adhered to no overarching legislative scheme; rather, the 
ability to collect DNA profiles expanded over a number of years by way of 
piecemeal legislation that gradually increased the police power to obtain and 
retain DNA profiles.20  Part III will turn to the discourse that surrounded the 
                                                                                                                   
 17 S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, [2009] Eur. Ct. H.R. (1581). 
 18 GENEWATCH UK, THE POLICE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE: BALANCING CRIME 
DETECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 38–46 (2005), available at http://www.genewatch. 
org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NationalDNADatabase.pdf. 
 19 Id. at 12. 
 20 See generally ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, cm. 2263, 
¶¶ 36–38 (U.K.) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT] (recommending DNA database); 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 172 (U.K.) (establishing National DNA 
Database); Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act, 1997, c. 17, §§ 1–3 (U.K.) (allowing for 
non-intimate sample to be taken from persons who committed a violent crime, sex offense, or 
burglary prior to 1995); Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16 (U.K.) (allowing for the 
indefinite retention of samples and fingerprints); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 § 10 (U.K.) 
162 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:157 
 
 
passing of those statutes and amendments, with a particular focus on how the 
legislature conceptualized individual privacy rights and sought to balance 
those rights with the original state interests.  Part IV will analyze the 
ECtHR’s decision in the case of S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, where the 
Court held that the indefinite retention of arrestee DNA profiles violated the 
Human Rights Act of 1998.  In its analysis, the Court applied a balancing 
test, attempting to strike the correct proportion between privacy protection 
and advancing state interests in crime prevention.21  Finally, Part V of this 
Note will examine the Supreme Court of the United States’ recent decision in 
Maryland v. King and how this opinion differs from that of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  This retrospective look at the United Kingdom’s 
initial venture into the world of DNA databasing provides a comprehensive 
view of the various downfalls to avoid as the federal and state governments 
within the U.S. attempt to refine their laws and employ DNA database 
systems to their fullest capabilities, while simultaneously protecting what 
privacy rights their citizens have.  In light of the recent Supreme Court 
decision, it appears as if the U.S. may have just taken the first step down a 
road already traveled.  
A.  Background on Forensic DNA Analysis 
In order to understand many of the topics and concepts embodied in this 
Note, it is important to understand the mechanisms of forensic DNA 
sampling and use.  In 1985, Professor Alec Jeffreys of Leicester University 
developed a method by which “patterns of chemical signals within the DNA 
molecule” that are unique to each person could be identified and recorded.22  
This form of identification, known as a DNA profile, soon began to be 
recognized as a valuable tool in aiding criminal investigations and other 
situations where determining identity was relevant, such as paternity suits.  
In modern criminal investigations, DNA evidence is considered 
biological physical evidence.23  When DNA sampling and analysis was first 
used in this capacity, the early technology required a sizeable sample of 
bodily fluid, such as semen or blood, in order to obtain a satisfactory 
                                                                                                                   
(allowing samples to be taken from any person arrested for a “recordable offence”—or any 
offence which could result in imprisonment). 
 21 See S. & Marper, [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581 at n.16. 
 22 Andrew Hall, DNA Fingerprints – Black Box or Black Hole?, 140 NEW L.J. 203 (Feb. 
1990).  
 23 See GENEWATCH UK, supra note 18, at 11. 
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profile.24  Today, with advances in DNA technology, analysts can often use a 
technique known as “touch DNA” to generate a full profile with as few as 
twenty dead skin cells.25  
There are three main types of DNA analysis currently used to aid forensic 
investigations: nuclear DNA analysis, mitochondrial DNA analysis, and Y-
Chromosome analysis.26  In all forms of DNA analysis, the process of 
generating a DNA profile includes obtaining a piece of evidence likely to 
contain DNA, isolating the DNA from that evidence, and then processing the 
DNA to obtain a series of markers known as the DNA profile.27  The markers 
are indicative of various alleles present at different locations (known as loci) 
in the DNA chain, or genome.28  
Current forensic DNA testing in the United States focuses on short 
tandem repeat (STR) analysis, a form of nuclear DNA testing.29  In this type 
of analysis, analysts evaluate specific loci found in nuclear DNA and create a 
DNA profile that consists of thirteen loci in the DNA chain.30  The chances 
of any two people (who are not identical twins) having the exact same 
thirteen loci DNA profile is estimated to be as high as one in one billion or 
more.31  While thirteen is the optimal number of loci, the FBI currently only 
requires a profile with ten identified loci in order for that profile to be 
uploaded into the National DNA Index System (NDIS) for forensic 
purposes.32 
Furthermore, the chain of markers used in forensic DNA identifications is 
what is commonly referred to as “junk DNA.”33  That is, it does not involve 
the full amount of information that a DNA sample could potentially hold 
about an individual and thus is an unnecessarily limited use of DNA 
sampling.  For instance, the DNA “fingerprints” used by criminal 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Id. at 26. 
 25 Touch DNA, DNA FORENSICS, available at http://www.dnaforensics.com/touchdna.aspx. 
 26 DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/ 
forensics/evidence/dna/basics/analyzing.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA 
Index System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-an 
alysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter CODIS FAQs]. 
 33 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING, PREDICTIONS 
OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 12 (2000), available at https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.pdf. 
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investigators today contain information about gender and the specific chain 
of markers can be used as an identifier, but they do not contain information 
about appearance, health, and behavior.34  These pieces of information can, 
however, be found elsewhere in the genome, which has sparked some of the 
controversy surrounding forensic DNA sampling.35 
For the purposes of this Note, it is also important to understand the 
distinction between a DNA sample and a DNA profile.  A sample is the 
physical specimen collected in order to generate a profile, i.e., blood, semen, 
saliva, or skin cells.36  A profile, on the other hand, refers to the string of 
numbers indicating which alleles are present at the loci.37  The profile is 
generated by a DNA analysis of the sample.  While a DNA profile derived 
from the so-called junk DNA may not contain much more than identifying 
information, a DNA sample may have much more information available for 
analysis.38  
II.  THE U.K. LEGISLATION 
The legislation that led the U.K. to the decision in S. & Marper v. United 
Kingdom was not formed pursuant to some overarching legislative scheme.  
On the contrary, the system, which came to govern the input and 
maintenance of samples and profiles in the NDNAD, came about as a result 
of several different pieces of legislation passed over the course of a decade.39  
Each contributing piece of legislation is examined in more in depth, 
beginning with the Recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice, which was the first body to recommend the establishment of a DNA 
database and the use of DNA testing to aid criminal investigations.  Each 
section will also discuss what concerns, if any, were espoused about the 
protection of privacy rights, or what general wariness was expressed at the 
rapidly expanding system. 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Id. at 61. 
 35 Id.  
 36 ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING WITH DNA EVIDENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 23 (2007). 
 37 See CODIS FAQs, supra note 32. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See discussion infra Part II.A–II.E. 
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A.  The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’s 1993 Recommendation 
In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended that 
the U.K. employ a DNA database.40  Their primary goal in adopting the 
database was to achieve a “more objective form of forensic identification.”41  
The Commission’s recommendation came as a result of several high-profile 
cases involving quashed convictions that ignited public debate about the 
criminal system and its effectiveness in achieving justice.42  The original 
intent behind establishing a DNA database was to obtain a more reliable way 
not only to secure convictions but also to narrow the field of suspects during 
a criminal investigation.43  The Commission also recommended that police 
should be able to take non-intimate DNA samples from those arrested for 
serious crimes and that clear legislation was necessary to provide for more 
extensive storage of DNA, both for the purposes of identifying offenders and 
for keeping a database.44  The recommendation further stated that samples 
could be obtained from those accused of serious offenses even where DNA 
evidence was irrelevant to the offense, and such DNA could be retained for 
further use if that person were to be convicted.45 
The overall report of the Commission was lengthy, with numerous 
recommendations for the improvement of the criminal justice system as a 
whole.46  As a result, these two specific points were in large part overlooked 
as they constituted some of the more minor recommendations of the 
Commission.  Public discourse seemed to focus on the Commission’s 
proposed Criminal Cases Review Authority, which was a body made up of 
lay members and lawyers and was intended to investigate alleged 
miscarriages of justice.47 
                                                                                                                   
 40 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, ¶¶ 35–38. 
 41 GENEWATCH UK, supra note 23, at 26. 
 42 Terry Kirby & Heather Mills, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Reformers 
Applaud Proposal for Body to Review Cases: New Authority Would Examine Possible 
Miscarriages of Justice, INDEPENDENT, July 7, 1993. 
 43 See Carling, supra note 8.  
 44 See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, ¶ 33. 
 45 Id. ¶ 34. 
 46 See generally id. (calling for researching jurors’ reasoning, reforming identification 
procedures, setting guidelines for witness and victim interviews, among other 
recommendations). 
 47 See John Wadham, Unravelling Miscarriages of Justice, 143 NEW L.J. 1650 (1993); 
Siobhan M. Keegan, The Criminal Cases Review Commission’s Effectiveness in Handling 
Cases From Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1776, 1801 (1999). 
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B.  The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act  
In 1994, the NDNAD was established by the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act.48  In addition to establishing the NDNAD, this Act also amended 
the definitions of intimate and non-intimate samples: classifying saliva, 
swabs from any part of the body that is not an orifice, and non-pubic hair as 
non-intimate samples.49  Significantly, different protocols governed the 
collection of intimate and non-intimate samples; samples that were 
considered non-intimate were easier to obtain.  Amending the definitions had 
the effect of allowing for the sampling of various substances that would 
contain DNA on the basis that they were now considered non-intimate 
samples.  The division between intimate and non-intimate samples appears to 
focus on the amount of physical invasion as opposed to the amount of 
information gathered. 
According to the amended definitions, intimate samples included 
“a) . . . blood, semen, or any other tissue fluid, urine or pubic hair; b) a dental 
impression; and c) a swab taken from a person’s body orifice other than the 
mouth.”50  Arguably, one’s DNA profile contains much more information 
about oneself than does a dental impression or even a fingerprint, since 
dental impressions and fingerprints can only provide identification 
information and DNA samples may contain information about race, sex, 
family, and genetic disorders.51  The DNA sample, however, can be obtained 
by less obtrusive means.  For example, using current technology, a DNA 
profile could be obtained with as few as twenty dead skin cells; obtaining a 
sufficient sample size would be as simple as swabbing someone’s hand—
which is arguably even less physically invasive than a typical buccal (oral) 
swab, dental impression, or collection of any type of bodily fluid, as it does 
not require entry into any orifice. 
Additionally, under this portion of the Act, there were still provisions for 
the destruction of evidence, as well as restrictions as to how and when the 
collected samples could be used in evidence.52  As discussed below, many of 
the provisions for destruction of samples were slowly eroded over time.  This 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 20, § 60A. 
 49 Id. § 58(3). 
 50 Id. § 58(2).  
 51 See DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing, supra note 26. 
 52 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 20, § 57.  
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is noteworthy, because indefinite retention of samples was one of the main 
issues the Marper court was concerned about.53 
C.  The Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act 
In 1997, an amendment to the Criminal Evidence Act extended the police 
power to allow the collection of non-intimate body samples from certain 
convicts without their consent.54  That is, non-intimate samples (as 
previously defined by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act) could be 
collected from persons convicted and detained at the time of enactment for 
certain offenses, including any sex crime, violent crime, or burglary that had 
been committed before the establishment of the NDNAD.55  This amendment 
also allowed for the collection of non-intimate samples from children and the 
mentally ill at the places where they were detained, provided they met the 
requirements for the collection of the sample.56 
The amendment enabled the collection of DNA samples from 
approximately 7,750 sexual offenders, violent offenders, and burglars; their 
profiles were subsequently put into the NDNAD.57  These changes to the 
Criminal Evidence Act stemmed directly from the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission.58  This bill was enacted for the purpose of “plug[ging]” 
the “loophole” left by its predecessor, namely the lack of any provision 
allowing for the collection of DNA samples from anyone convicted before 
April 10, 1995.59  
After some discussion in Parliament of the excellent advances in criminal 
investigations directly attributable to the NDNAD and advances in DNA 
technology, this bill was accepted with support from all sides of the House.60  
In advancing the bill, Mr. Nigel Evans of the House of Lords noted six 
benefits, including “the early identification of linked cases, the early arrest of 
offenders, valuable intelligence, early exoneration of innocent suspects, 
easier identification of bodies and, finally, deterrence.”61  Mr. Evans also 
made note of the potential usefulness of a DNA database in solving so-called 
                                                                                                                   
 53 See S. & Marper, supra note 17. 
 54 Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act, supra note 20, §§ 1–3. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  
 57 290 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1997) 1029-30 (U.K.). 
 58 578 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 105-112 (U.K.). 
 59 Id. at 110. 
 60 Id. at 112. 
 61 288 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1997) 1230-31 (U.K.). 
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“cold cases,” linking those already convicted of one crime to another, as yet 
unsolved, offense.62 
These six reasons comport fully with all of the reasons advanced by current 
supporters of DNA sampling of arrestees and have been found by courts to be 
compelling state interests.63  In a follow-up statement, Mr. Kirkhope, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, spoke at 
length on the six aforementioned interests served by expanding DNA 
sampling.64  Mr. Kirkhope also spoke of “safeguarding . . . the interests of 
innocent members of the public,” mentioning the security of the DNA 
database, and the ability of DNA science to help eliminate innocent suspects 
while simultaneously identifying perpetrators.65  While he further noted that 
there is a possibility of error, Mr. Kirkhope asserted that the benefits of 
expanding DNA testing outweighed any potential mistakes or undesirable 
consequences in light of the precautions taken by the Forensic Science Service, 
such as double testing samples when a match is reported and extensive 
safeguards against contamination of samples.66 
D.  The Data Protection Act of 1998 
The Data Protection Act, though it does not relate directly to the 
operation of the NDNAD, specifies a number of “protection principles” that 
must be met when certain types of personal data are collected and stored. 
Three principles in particular are highly relevant to the topic of DNA 
collection and retention.  Notably: “Personal data shall be adequate, relevant, 
and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are 
processed”; data should not be kept for any time period longer than 
necessary to achieve the purpose it was obtained for, and measures should be 
taken to guard against the unlawful processing of personal data.67  Of 
particular importance is the principle that data obtained for a particular 
purpose shall only be retained for as long as necessary to achieve that 
purpose.68  This provision is in direct conflict with the requirement adopted 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Id. 
 63 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1063–64, reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 404 (3d Cir. 2011); Why Pass the DNA 
Law?, DNA SAVES, http://dnasaves.org/dna_law.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 64 See PARL. DEB., H.C., supra note 61, at 1233–36. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, sch. 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
 68 Id.  
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in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Amendment that allows for the 
indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples.69  
Furthermore, this Act was explicitly considered and passed in light of the 
adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).70  
During the Parliamentary debates on this particular bill, Baroness Nicholson 
in the House of Lords discussed at length the fact that the U.K. had no 
express right to privacy, which many of its citizens may have assumed they 
had.  She noted the arguments of Lord Lester, who claimed that in 
incorporating the Convention, the U.K. had a “positive obligation” to create 
a right of privacy.71  
Mr. Lester’s comments arose during the debates surrounding a particular 
clause of the Act that would greatly expand the police power.72  He proposed 
that rather than relying on the dovetailing of U.K. common law with the 
provisions of Article 8 of the Convention, it would be more desirable for 
Parliament to affirmatively create a right to privacy.73  This, he argued, was 
preferable to leaving that obligation to the courts, where they would be 
forced to interpret the law, carving out a common law right of privacy.74   
Mr. Lester further questioned the Solicitor-General as to whether the 
adoption of the bill as-is would in fact violate Article 8 of the Convention.75  
The confusing response was that the bill itself would constitute no such 
violation, but that any order pursuant to the bill would have to be considered 
in light of the Convention, and that the Government must be trusted to 
exercise good faith in adhering to the principles of both.76  Put simply: the 
response to concerns about the U.K.’s ability to comply with Article 8 of the 
Convention without first establishing a statutory right to privacy in 
Parliament was that they should “accept not only the Government’s good 
faith, but whatever decision they reach” when a question arose under the 
Convention.77  
                                                                                                                   
 69 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, c. 60, § 642k (U.K.). 
 70 585 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998) 436 (U.K.). 
 71 Id. at 450. 
 72 In a letter to Baroness Nicholson, the Data Registrar indicated that the debated clause was 
“unprecedented” and would operate in such a way as to take away protections given by the 
previous Data Protection Act of 1984.  587 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998) 1099 (U.K.). 
 73 Id. at 1096.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 1103. 
 76 Id. at 1103-04. 
 77 Id. at 1105. 
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E.  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 
In 2001, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), was 
extended by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPO 2001).78  One 
of the most significant changes that resulted from this extension was that it 
allowed for the indefinite retention of all DNA samples and fingerprints, 
where PACE had originally expressly prohibited such retention.79  The CJPO 
only applied to England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland remained 
free to destroy samples of those acquitted or those against whom the charges 
had been dropped.80  
Additionally, the samples of consenting volunteers who took part in mass 
screenings would be retained indefinitely as well.81  Samples from volunteers 
or those otherwise consenting to retention need not be destroyed pursuant to 
other sections of the Act and had no restrictions upon the purpose for which 
they may be used.82  Further, consent could not be withdrawn.83  In a sense, 
samples that were voluntarily given were provided with less protection than 
those obtained from suspected criminals.  
As a purportedly limiting measure, Section 82(2)(1A)(b) of the Act 
provides that retained samples “shall not be used by any person except for 
purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of 
an offence or the conduct of a prosecution.”84  As noted above, this conflicts 
with the requirements of the 1998 Data Protection Act.  Under that statute, 
once a person has been acquitted of the crime with which they were charged 
and the investigation is no longer ongoing, their personal information should 
be purged from the system entirely.  It was this section in particular that 
would eventually lead to challenges under Articles 8 and 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.85 
The difference between the number of samples destroyed or removed 
from the database before and after the enactment of CJPO 2001 is startling.  
From 1999 to 2001, 137,293 records were removed from the database, 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Criminal Justice and Police Act, supra note 20. 
 79 Jason M. Swergold, Note, To Have and to Hold: The Future of DNA Retention in the 
United Kingdom, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 179, 184 (2010).  
 80 See Criminal Justice and Police Act, supra note 20 (applying the CJPO only to England 
and Wales). 
 81 Id. § 82(4)(3AC).          
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. § 82(2)(7A)(b). 
 85 Charles Bourne, Retaining Fingerprints and DNA Samples, 152 NEW L.J. 1693 (2002). 
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compared to only 70,035 records removed from 2001 to 2004.86  Samples 
may have been destroyed and profiles removed from the NDNAD for the 
following reasons: the individual died; the samples were taken in error; the 
individual was acquitted or the charges against him were dropped; or the 
records were duplicates.87  
In December 2003, an estimated 109,000 profiles belonging to those who 
had been acquitted remained in the NDNAD.88  Of those who had voluntarily 
given their DNA samples, approximately 10,500 profiles were in the 
database.89  This subset primarily includes people who were asked to provide 
a sample as a result of an intelligence screening exercise conducted by law 
enforcement when an offender was believed to live nearby.90 
F.  The Criminal Justice Act Extension 
Finally, in April 2004, certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
went into force, allowing for the collection and indefinite retention of 
samples from all persons arrested for any “recordable offense” who had been 
taken to a police station in connection with that offense.91  In other words, 
regardless of whether a person was ever charged or convicted, his or her 
DNA sample was obtained once he or she was detained at the police station, 
and that sample could be kept and cross-referenced indefinitely. 
In the Parliamentary debates surrounding this extension, an amendment 
allowing for the destruction of samples and fingerprints in certain situations 
was considered and rejected.92  In arguing against the amendment, Baroness 
Scotland, then Minister of State for the Criminal Justice System and Law 
Reform, took note of the approximately 103,000 DNA profiles in the 
NDNAD which would have previously been deleted from the system due to 
an acquittal.93  Of these, over 4,500 profiles were matched to crime scene 
samples, including the samples taken from “26 murders, 15 attempted 
murders, 27 rapes, 13 sexual offences, 14 aggravated burglaries and six of 
the supply of controlled drugs.”94  She used these statistics to argue that 
                                                                                                                   
 86 420 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 1295, 1296W (U.K.). 
 87 Id.  
 88 415 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2003) 616W (U.K.).  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (U.K.). 
 92 654 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 1940-41 (U.K.). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1941.  
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reverting back to a system that deleted the DNA profiles of acquitted persons 
would be an undesirable step backwards in the use of DNA as an 
investigative tool.  Still, this argument disregards the approximately 99,000 
profiles of acquitted persons that were never matched to any sort of crime or 
criminal investigation.95  
III.  THE PRIVACY DEBATE 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s all these pieces of legislation enjoyed a 
great deal of public support.  The public had professed general safety 
concerns and, on the whole, people seemed concerned about the police not 
catching the right criminals or not catching as many criminals as they 
could.96  In fact, in 1994 the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
commented on the establishment of protocols for collecting DNA samples 
for criminal investigations:  
Almost all the correspondence we have received has been 
supportive of our proposals to allow DNA samples to be taken 
in all recordable offences.  The police have warmly welcomed 
our plans.  They help bring the law into line with the 
capabilities of modern technology.  The full force of modern 
science will be brought to bear upon the modern criminal.97  
However, as early as 2002 the tides of public opinion began to shift as DNA 
technology rapidly advanced and the databanks began to expand.  Human 
rights groups in particular expressed growing concern about the future of 
DNA testing and privacy rights, including how the databanks would or could 
be misused in the future, given that the U.K. did not until very recently have 
a recognized right to privacy.98 
A.  Development of the Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom 
U.K. common law does not recognize a right to privacy.99  Some 
commentators have extrapolated from this that because there had been no 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. 
 96 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 10. 
 97 248 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1994) 1335-36 Wf (U.K.). 
 98 See text at supra Part II.A. 
 99 Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62. 
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statutory or otherwise enumerated right to privacy the NDNAD could not 
possibly have violated such a right.100  However, this statement ignores the 
implication of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which formally incorporated 
the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law.101  Article 8 of the 
Convention explicitly states: “Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life.”102  The Convention was integrated into U.K. law the 
same year that the Data Protection Act was passed, and a mere four years 
after the establishment of the NDNAD.103  The adoption of both of these 
statutes indicates an awareness and acceptance on the part of Parliament that 
citizens do have some sort of privacy right and that certain precautions 
should be taken in order to avoid violating that right.104  
Furthermore, questions about a right to privacy in the U.K. arose in many 
different contexts even before the adoption of the Convention.105  Notably, 
the notion of an officially recognized right to privacy first experienced a 
great deal of discussion in England in the context of paparazzi and famous 
figures.106  Many of the arguments against recognizing a separate right to 
privacy revolved around the notion that such a right was already protected by 
the law of confidence.107  The law of confidence, briefly put, protects private 
information from being publicly disseminated to the detriment of the party 
whom the information concerns.108  Others argued that the law of confidence, 
though it provided protection in some areas, did not go far enough.109  One 
such proponent, Lord Keith, stated that “the right to personal privacy is 
clearly one which the law should in this field seek to protect.”110  
                                                                                                                   
 100 See generally Carling, supra note 8 (illustrating the differences between the U.K. and the 
U.S. law, particularly cultural views of the right to privacy). 
 101 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
Convention]. 
 102 Convention, supra note 101, art. 8. 
 103 Human Rights Act, supra note 101 (enacted in 1998); Data Protection Act, supra note 67 
(enacted in 1998); Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, supra note 20 (enacted in 1994). 
 104 See text at supra Part II.D. 
 105 Jonathan Morgan, Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble, 62 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 444 (2003). 
 106 Id. 
 107 E.g., Patrick Milmo, Confidence and Privacy, 143 NEW L.J. 1629 (1993) (illustrating 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of confidence law in protecting privacy). 
 108 Attorney General v. Observer Ltd., [1990] 1 A.C. 109. 
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The right to privacy was discussed in other contexts as well.  In the 
context of sophisticated surveillance techniques such as software that logs 
keystrokes used to monitor employees in the workplace, one commentator 
from the U.K. noted that “[i]n a democratic society, privacy remains a basic 
right of citizens.”111  Of course, she adds that there will always be conflict 
among enumerated rights—the difficulty lies in determining the correct 
balance.112  Thus, the question of privacy rights and the correct balance to be 
struck concerning those rights was still open at the time that legislation 
regarding DNA databases was adopted.  
B.  NDNAD and Arrestee DNA Considered in Light of the Privacy Debate 
Around 2002, the debate about the potential of arrestee DNA samples to 
constitute privacy intrusions began to intensify.  There was some public 
concern that DNA profiles were not used to their full advantage, which is 
indicated in the legislative history of the extension of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984.113  This concern stemmed primarily from two cases in 
which DNA evidence was able to link suspects to a rape and a murder.  In 
those cases, the DNA profiles were not able to be used against the suspects 
because the offenses which led to their collection failed to result in a 
conviction.114  
In direct contrast, however, was growing concern on the part of human 
rights groups that the expanding use of DNA samples was, or could be, a 
violation of privacy.115  After acknowledging that Article 8 of the 
Convention allowed for a recognized right to privacy, many were of the 
opinion that the use and retention of DNA samples did not violate that right.  
Section 8(2) states, in part, that no public authority should interfere with the 
right to respect for a private life “except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety . . . [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime.”116  
The argument was that since the express goal of the systematic collection of 
DNA was crime prevention, there was no violation of the Convention. 
                                                                                                                   
 111 Orla Ward, Is Big Browser Watching You?, 150 NEW L.J. 1414 (2000).  
 112 Id. 
 113 S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 1581 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15. 
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 115 See generally GENEWATCH UK, supra note 23; New Police Powers Unveiled, BBC NEWS 
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In 2002, Baroness Hale disagreed with the holding of the House of Lords 
in the case of S. & Marper v. United Kingdom.117  She indicated in her 
dissent that the retention of both fingerprints and DNA data constituted a 
violation of a person’s right to a private life.118  Information about an 
individual’s genetic make-up, she reasoned, could be the absolute most 
private information one could possibly obtain about a person.119  However, 
she agreed with the majority opinion that the government had provided 
sufficient justifications for the use and retention of DNA information in that 
particular case.120 
Also in 2002, there were growing concerns about the ethnic makeup of 
the samples retained by the NDNAD.  Notably, ethnic minorities were 
disproportionately represented in the NDNAD, indicating that the database 
may be biased against minorities who tend to make up the majority of the 
convicted population.121  There were several proposals for how to combat 
this apparent discrimination.  The inventor of the DNA fingerprint was 
reportedly alarmed at the discriminatory practices that surrounded the use of 
his technique, and called for the creation of a national database that would 
store the profiles of every citizen in the U.K.122  
In her comment in the New Law Journal in 2002, B. Mahendra also 
argued that the most effective way to battle a disproportionate (and thus 
seemingly discriminatory) amount of minorities in the NDNAD was to 
institute a national DNA database and to incorporate national genetic identity 
cards.123  Mahendra brushed off “slippery slope” type arguments, saying that 
to give credence to such arguments is to remain “blind to the workings of the 
modern world.”124  However, Mahendra’s argument holds little water.  First, 
she writes that one should lay aside any ethical or moral arguments 
concerning invasions of privacy and preservation of civil liberties.125  Later, 
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however, she claims there is no convincing argument based on civil liberties 
against a national database.126  According to her, citizens have a “right to 
justice and the duty not merely to assist the authorities but also [their] fellow 
citizens,” and it is these rights and duties that trump any right to privacy.127 
In early 2005, GeneWatch U.K. issued a report proposing limitations on 
the use and functions of the NDNAD, as there were serious concerns about 
future misuses of the system.128  The concerns included discrimination,129 
‘function creep,’130 expansion of the databank to include the entire 
population,131 increasing “back door” use of DNA databases that were 
initially established for health or research purposes,132 and the possible 
linkage of multiple government databases.133  On the subject of retaining the 
profiles and samples from unconvicted persons, the report asked “[A]re we 
citizens or suspects?” Considering that the NDNAD essentially creates a 
subset of people who are continuously under suspicion, despite potentially 
having never been convicted of any offense, GeneWatch U.K. argues that 
this may serve to “subtly alter” the way in which these people are viewed by 
their government or even by other citizens.134 
In response to the argument that only the guilty have anything to fear, the 
GeneWatch U.K. report made reference to historical accounts of the misuse 
of citizen information by communist and fascist regimes throughout 
Europe.135  GeneWatch U.K. reasoned that the fact there was no indication of 
wrongdoing was not a good enough argument for the expansion of the 
database; the potential for wrongdoing was enough.136 Furthermore, the 
“nothing to hide” argument proceeds on the premise that valuing privacy is 
about hiding a wrong.  While privacy is a difficult, perhaps impossible, 
notion to succinctly define, it encompasses such a range of ideas that it is 
safe to say that a desire for privacy does not necessarily stem from a guilty 
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conscience.  The “nothing to hide” argument, while strong on its face, 
crumbles under scrutiny.  
The GeneWatch U.K. report also indicated ways in which DNA profiles 
might be misused in the future.  Specifically, it cited the possibility of 
attempts to use DNA sequences to predict ethnicity and using current 
NDNAD profiles to determine where a suspect may come from.137  
Depending on how a person views DNA sampling and retention, this could 
be considered either a powerful investigative tool or another way in which 
racial discrimination could be (and, in the view of some, is being) 
perpetuated.138  
Additionally, the GeneWatch U.K. report included some statistics on 
what happens once someone is arrested by the police.  While the survey was 
outdated, having taken place in 1993–1994, the results shed light on the 
implications of a DNA database as widely used as the NDNAD.139  In that 
time frame, 1.75 million people had been arrested for both recordable and 
non-recordable offences.140  Over one third of the arrestees had been detained 
for “relatively minor public order offenses” and only four percent had been 
arrested for the “most serious violent crimes.”141  Of those arrested, only 
forty percent were eventually convicted.142  Thus, of the persons arrested 
during that two-year period, over one million were never convicted.143  
Perhaps even more importantly, only fifty-two percent of suspects were even 
charged.  The rest of the arrested persons either had no further action taken 
against them, were cautioned and released, or their charges were dealt with 
in “various other ways.”144 
In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair indicated his support for a national 
DNA database, saying it was “vital for catching serious criminals.”145  
Echoing these sentiments in 2007, Lord Justice Sedley espoused his belief 
that the NDNAD should be expanded to include the DNA profile of every 
citizen in the U.K. in order to avoid discrimination against ethnic 
                                                                                                                   
 137 Id. at 31. 
 138 Id. at 49. 
 139 Id. at 41. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 George Jones, DNA Database ‘Should Include All,’ TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2006), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1532210/DNA-database-should-include-all.html. 
178 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:157 
 
 
minorities.146  Both men were met with resistance in Parliament from both 
the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives and the database was never 
expanded that far.147 
In 2007, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics issued a report (the Nuffield 
Report) strongly advocating against the government’s then-current proposals 
for further expanding the power to take DNA samples.148  The Nuffield 
Report advanced arguments regarding proportionality, costs of the system, 
and addressed the commonly advanced argument that “those who are 
innocent have nothing to fear.”149  Their response was even more concrete 
than that posited in the GeneWatch U.K. report.  In addition to the “what if” 
response indicated in GeneWatch, the Nuffield Report referenced the actual 
harm that can be suffered by an individual who is merely the subject of 
police suspicions.150  Even without an arrest or investigation leading to a 
conviction, persons involved in a police investigation may be distressed 
throughout the process and stigmatized in society by mere association with a 
criminal investigation.151 
Second, the Nuffield Report indicated that maintenance of the national 
database could actually hinder the pursuit of criminal justice.  As a practical 
issue, the Nuffield Report noted that “fewer than 20% of crime scenes” 
actually undergo any type of forensic examination152 and recommended that 
instead of increased sampling and retention of DNA, resources should be 
focused on fully examining crime scenes and other types of investigative 
work.153  Further, the report claimed that a national DNA database, as 
advocated by some, would not only be hugely expensive, but it would in fact 
have a very small effect on national crime rates.154  Despite claims that the 
collection and retention of DNA samples aids the prevention of crime, the 
crime rates in the U.K. have not shown a marked improvement.155 
Third, the Nuffield Report warned that DNA evidence used during court 
proceedings sways juries a great deal, even though it may utilize science and 
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statistics that jurors do not actually understand.156  Like several other 
detractors, the Nuffield Report noted that the NDNAD could further 
exasperate problems with governance and ethical oversight, dangers of 
inferring ethnicity, and racial discrimination in criminal justice systems that 
already experience an ingrained type of discrimination.157  
Fourth, the report showed concern over the fact that, in the U.K., children 
were treated the same as adults for the purposes of the NDNAD.158  In 2005 
there were roughly 740,000 persons in the database whose samples were 
obtained when they were under the age of eighteen.159  Traditionally, 
criminal justice systems are more lenient on minors and treat them as equals 
to adults in only a handful of situations, often decided on a case-by-case 
basis.  Thus, the inclusion of minors in the database in the same manner as 
adult records are obtained and kept is troubling. 
Finally, with respect to volunteer samples and samples that were given 
with consent of the donating party, the Nuffield Council recommended that 
they not be held indefinitely; instead, the consent should be conditional and 
revocable.160  Individuals who had provided samples in order to aid a specific 
criminal investigation should be able to condition the retention of their 
profiles on the duration of the investigation for which the sample was 
given.161  Allowing this would permit those citizens to remove themselves 
from the pool of potential suspects, rather than treating volunteers the same 
as arrestees and convicts. 
In light of the many issues identified, the final recommendation of the 
Nuffield Report was that police should only be allowed to retain the DNA 
information about persons who were convicted of a crime.162  It noted in 
particular that the police power with regards to collecting and retaining DNA 
samples and other types of personal information was already comparatively 
broad in England and Wales.163  Prior to the final recommendation of the 
U.K. government to further expand those powers, the Nuffield Report 
strongly advocated abandoning proposals that would allow for the collection 
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and retention of DNA samples for something as simple as littering and minor 
traffic offenses.164  
Instead, the authors of the Nuffield Report indicated that the Scottish 
practices regarding DNA were a preferable alternative.165  In Scotland (which 
was not affected by some of the legislation expanding the retention of 
samples and profiles in the NDNAD),166 only the samples of those “charged 
with serious violent or sexual offences” could be retained without a 
conviction.167  Even then, the samples could only be kept for three to five 
years.168  Profiles and samples taken in connection with other recordable 
offences would require a conviction in order to be maintained in the 
databank.169  It is in the face of these growing concerns and arguments 
against the widespread use of the NDNAD, and with extraordinary 
technological advances being made in the field of DNA identification, that 
the European Court for Human Rights heard the pivotal case of S. & Marper 
v. United Kingdom. 
IV.  THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DECISION IN S & MARPER V. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
S. & Marper v. United Kingdom was the critical case in which the ECtHR 
ruled that the indefinite retention of DNA profiles from persons arrested but 
never convicted of a crime constituted violations of the Convention.170  In 
each of their cases, both S. (name excluded because he was a minor at the 
time of arrest) and Marper had been arrested but never convicted.171  S. had 
been arrested at the age of eleven for robbery, and Marper was arrested for 
harassment of his partner.172  S. was acquitted of the charges against him and 
the case against Marper was discontinued.173  
Each defendant petitioned the police to have their DNA samples and 
fingerprints destroyed, but these requests were refused.174  When they took 
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their respective challenges to the Administrative Court, S. and Marper were 
rejected there as well.175  The Court of Appeal, in upholding the decision of 
the Administrative Court, determined that “DNA profiles reveal only limited 
personal information.”176  
The ECtHR began its opinion by noting that “privacy” had never been 
exhaustively defined in English law.177  The court determined, therefore, that 
privacy can include multiple elements of one’s identity, including health 
information and ethnicity.178  It further found, unequivocally, that all three 
categories of information at question in the case (fingerprints, DNA profiles, 
and cellular samples) are personal data such that they fall within the purview 
of the Data Protection Act 1998.179  
Further, in holding that the indefinite retention of DNA samples of 
unconvicted persons constituted a violation of the Human Rights Act, the 
court found that DNA samples contain a “substantial amount” of personal 
data, particularly considering the ability to identify the possible perpetrator 
of a crime from examining the DNA of his family members.180  The ECtHR 
determined that the retention of these samples interfered with the petitioners’ 
rights to a private life.181  The court also noted that the U.K. was the only 
member state of the Council of Europe that expressly permitted the indefinite 
retention of DNA and cellular samples of people who had never been 
convicted of a crime.182 
Depending heavily on its opinion in Van der Velden v. the Netherlands, 
the court focused on how the information contested in this case might be 
used, or misused, in the future.183  Van der Velden concerned cellular 
material; there, the court considered that, “given the use to which cellular 
material in particular could conceivably be put in the future, the systematic 
retention of that material was sufficiently intrusive to disclose interference 
with the right to respect for private life.”184 
The ECtHR further held in Marper that the indefinite retention of 
personal information contained in cellular samples constitutes a per se 
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interference with the right to respect for a private life.185  The fact that 
authorities only use a limited portion of the information contained in those 
samples was of no consequence to the Court’s ruling.186  Even considering 
the difference between samples and profiles, the court noted that DNA 
profiles “contain substantial amounts of unique personal data” that go far 
beyond only providing information about identity.187  As support for this 
proposition, the Court noted the ability of a DNA profile to identify familial 
relationships or ethnic origin.188 
In 2010, in the aftermath of the ECtHR’s ruling, the U.K. changed the law 
to specify that acquitted citizens’ DNA profiles collected during an 
investigation of a crime may only be retained for a maximum of six years.189  
While some commentators argue that the new incarnation is still a violation 
of the HRA,190 it has yet to be overruled.  Additionally, even though the 
DNA records of unconvicted persons were removed from the system, records 
of arrest remain and the law allows these arrest records to remain accessible 
indefinitely.191 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES’ DECISION IN      
MARYLAND V. KING 
The case of Maryland v. King involves petitioner Alonzo King who was 
arrested in 2009 on assault charges.192  Upon arrest, King underwent a buccal 
swab for collection of his DNA as part of routine booking procedure in 
Maryland.193  His DNA was linked to a rape that had occurred in 2003 and he 
was convicted on those charges.194  King challenged this conviction on the 
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basis that the collection of his DNA incident to his arrest for assault was an 
unreasonable search and seizure.195  The Supreme Court upheld his 
conviction, finding the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  In 
doing so, it may have taken the first step towards more comprehensive DNA 
collection and retention laws, allowing the United States to follow the 
footsteps of the United Kingdom into a mire of privacy violations. 
The Maryland statute on DNA collection (the Act) provides for the 
collection of DNA from arrestees who are charged with violent crimes, 
burglary, attempted violent crimes, and attempted burglary.196  Once the 
sample is collected, it may only be uploaded to a database after the accused 
has been arraigned.197  The Act does contain a number of safeguards.  For 
instance, it allows for the immediate destruction of any samples if the 
accused is acquitted, the conviction is reversed, or the defendant is 
pardoned.198 
The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, mentioned each of the 
aforementioned safeguards.  However, the Court never indicated which of 
these safeguards, if any, were essential to its holding that a search and 
seizure pursuant to the Act constituted a reasonable invasion of privacy given 
the state interests to be served.199  The state interests advanced by the King 
Court strongly resemble some of those advanced by advocates of the 
NDNAD in the U.K., including: identification of potential criminals, 
ensuring the safety of those charged with detaining arrestees, ensuring the 
presence of the accused at trial, assessing the danger a person may pose to 
the public at large, and freeing the wrongfully accused.200  These are strong 
state interests and the use of DNA in criminal investigations in furtherance of 
these interests is indisputable.  However, the Court focused heavily on these 
end goals, noting the “unmatched potential of DNA identification”201 to 
serve them, but glossed lightly over the privacy interests at stake. 
There are two prongs to assessing the reasonableness of a search: the 
level of invasion or intrusiveness of the search and the person’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy.202  Beginning with the level of intrusion necessary to 
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obtain a DNA sample, Justice Kennedy assures the reader that a buccal swab 
is a minimal intrusion; a simple swipe of the cheek is in no way comparable 
to invasive surgery, or even as invasive as some other normal booking 
procedures.203  Next, the opinion addresses the arrestee’s “legitimate 
expectations of privacy.”  It is well-settled that persons who undergo an 
arrest supported by probable cause have a reduced expectation of privacy.204  
The opinion indicates that the sampling of one’s DNA is not as invasive or 
potentially revealing as a search of one’s home.205  However, this view is 
flawed. 
The Court in this case focuses on the importance of DNA profiles for the 
identification of an accused.  In its review of the amount of information 
contained in a DNA profile, the opinion glosses over the ability to determine 
ethnic origin or familial relationships.206  It compares a DNA profile to a 
photograph or a fingerprint,207 both of which are capable of revealing much 
less information about a person than is a DNA profile.  The Court thus 
frames DNA profiles as nearly harmless intrusions upon a person who has a 
diminished expectation of privacy because they have already been suspected 
of some sort of wrongdoing. 
In his blistering dissent, joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor, Justice Scalia heavily criticizes the majority opinion’s reliance 
on the fact that DNA is used only for identification.208  He notes that 
fingerprints and photographs are taken for purposes of identification; DNA is 
taken for purposes of solving crimes.209  He appreciates that this is a noble 
objective, but argues that it must fall to other more important goals, 
including protecting citizens from suspicionless searches.210  Justice Scalia’s 
premonition is simple: “As an entirely predictable consequence of [this] 
decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database 
if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”211  
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Thus, a likely long-term consequence of this opinion will be a U.S. 
equivalent to the NDNAD. 
Bolstering this conclusion is the apparent breadth of the decision itself.  
The majority in this case notes that its decision will implicate the DNA 
collection statutes in every state that has such legislation, yet it issues a broad 
opinion that offers little guidance to state legislatures or lower courts.  By 
treating DNA as a simple identification tool, the Court simply puts off the 
decision of what limits there must be to DNA collection, retention, or use.  
More importantly, without noting which of the safeguards found in the 
Maryland Act are essential to the legitimate protection of privacy, the Court 
opens the door for a multitude of DNA collection and retention statutes that 
range in their levels of protection.  In stressing the importance of the state 
interests to be served and diminishing the far-reaching capabilities of 
forensic DNA analysis, the Court has opened the door for the U.S. to 
legislate itself into the same predicament that the U.K. was in by 2008. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the early days of using DNA as an investigative tool, governments 
were optimistic about the ability of this new technology to help solve and 
potentially prevent crime.  It was, and remains, one of the most powerful 
tools available to those involved with criminal investigations.  In the U.K., 
this optimism, combined with public approval and a lack of a clearly defined 
right to privacy, enabled the creation and evolution of one of the largest and 
fastest growing DNA databases in the world.  Over the course of a decade, 
the U.K. continuously passed legislation that expanded its police power in an 
unprecedented fashion.  
As the U.K. government became more industrious in its cataloguing of 
personal information, the public and various human rights groups became 
concerned with the system’s potential to violate personal privacy rights.  
Eventually, the ECtHR held that the U.K. had surpassed its limits and ruled 
that the indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles from unconvicted 
persons was a violation of international human rights law. 
The ECtHR hinged its decision on the unlimited time span for which 
personal information could be retained by the government, the nature of the 
information that could be gleaned from a DNA sample or profile, and the 
difficulties innocent people face in getting their records erased from the 
national database.  As a direct result of this ruling, profiles of unconvicted 
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persons are no longer allowed to remain in the U.K. databases indefinitely, 
irrespective of the claimed governmental interest in preventing crime.  
While the U.K. is different from some democratic societies in that it has 
no statutory or constitutional right to privacy, other countries may be well 
served by considering the evolution of laws regarding DNA databases in the 
U.K., as well as the ruling and reasoning of the ECtHR in Marper, in 
fashioning their own arrestee DNA legislation or databases.  In the United 
States, of the twenty-eight states that allow for the collection of DNA upon 
arrest, only seven also require state-initiated expungement; the rest specify 
that it is the citizen’s responsibility to initiate expungement proceedings.212  
Requiring citizen-initiated expungement can be problematic for many 
reasons, such as the time involved in obtaining a court order and 
socioeconomic factors that may disproportionately prevent one class of 
people from navigating the legal system in an attempt to get a court order, 
among others.  Considering the additional required time and costs of 
obtaining a lawyer to assist with procuring the necessary order for 
expungement, most citizens are unlikely to go through the process necessary 
to have their DNA profile removed from the databases.  This, in turn, 
translates to more and more profiles of exonerated or acquitted persons being 
retained in the DNA databases—the exact practice the ECtHR took steps to 
eliminate.  
As the United States strives toward using DNA technology to its full 
advantage without violating the rights of citizens, it may be useful to 
consider the findings of other high courts, as well as the overall evolution of 
DNA legislation in other countries.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Maryland v. King found that a simple buccal swab to obtain a DNA sample 
for the purposes of identification of a person arrested for a serious offense 
was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.  While the 
Maryland law in question in King had many of the safeguards desired by 
privacy rights advocates and mentioned by the ECtHR, the Court’s decision 
was not expressly limited to those statutes with similar protective measures.  
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court views DNA profiles primarily as a 
mode of identification, and it did not concern itself with future potential uses 
or the potential for familial searches.  Many would argue that this is an 
oversimplification of the true utility of DNA profiles and databases, but that 
is an argument that the Court is sure to see again.  It is highly likely that 
DNA collection statutes will continue to proliferate in the United States, and 
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the Court will face challenges to the scope of such statutes in the future.  
While the decision in Maryland v. King may be reminiscent of the strong 
support DNA collection and retention initially enjoyed in the U.K., it 
remains to be seen if the United States will allow the establishment of a 
system as far-reaching and comprehensive as the NDNAD. 
An individual’s right to privacy and right to be free from unnecessary 
government interference—the “right to be let alone—are core values not 
only of the American legal system, but also of American culture.213  In this 
country and in any other country considering arrestee DNA sampling and 
retention, legislation should always be considered in light of the statistics 
surrounding arrestee DNA sampling, the potentially inadequate safeguards 
against sample retention in cases that result in nonconviction, and the 
difficulties many would face in getting their records expunged if the process 
is not state-initiated.  Otherwise, arrestee DNA databases across the world 
may experience a fate similar to that of the NDNAD in the U.K.—
continuously strengthened until the system infringes on any number of 
human rights. 
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